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INTRODUCTION
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
1
Sixth Amendment requires that any fact used to increase a criminal
sentence beyond its statutory maximum must be “submitted to a jury,
2
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court carved out one
narrow but significant exception to this rule: the fact of a prior conviction may be used as a sentence-elevating factor without being
3
found by a jury. The central question addressed by this Comment is
whether the elevation of an adult’s sentence on the basis of a prior
juvenile adjudication is constitutionally permissible under Apprendi.
My contention is that a satisfactory answer to this question must take
into account the structural role of the jury. An analysis premised on
an understanding of the jury guarantee as an individual right aimed
at assuring accurate fact-finding is necessarily incomplete. Once the
role of the jury guarantee as a fundamental reservation of power in
4
our constitutional structure is fully appreciated, it becomes clear that
sentence elevation based on prior juvenile non-jury adjudications
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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
Id.
This understanding of the jury right is perhaps most commonly associated with Akhil
Amar.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 81–118 (1998) (describing the Framers’ intent in passing the Sixth
Amendment as providing a democratic check on the the judiciary). This idea has been
more recently developed by Laura Appleman. See generally Laura I. Appleman, The Lost
Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397 (2009) (providing extensive historical support for the notion that the jury right is a community right rather than an individual
right). Appreciation of the jury’s structural role is not limited to the scholarly literature,
but can also be seen throughout a number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions—in particular, the opinions and dissents of Justice Scalia. See infra Part III.A.
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cannot be reconciled with the robust conception of the Sixth
Amendment articulated in Apprendi and subsequent cases.
Despite the dubious constitutionality of treating non-jury juvenile
adjudications as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes, state legislatures and the U.S. Congress have passed recidivism statutes that enable the use of juvenile adjudications as elevating factors in criminal
5
sentencing. Most state and federal courts that have addressed the issue have held that the use of juvenile non-jury adjudications to elevate subsequent adult criminal sentences does not violate Apprendi’s
6
command. Only Louisiana’s Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
7
have taken the opposite position. Oregon’s high court has adopted
5

6

7

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (2) (2006) (defining some juvenile adjudications as qualifying convictions for purposes of a provision mandating a minimum fifteen-year sentence
for illegal possession of a firearm by a defendant with three previous qualifying convictions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 1999) (treating some juvenile adjudications
as prior felony convictions for purpose of the state’s three strikes law).
See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause juvenile
adjudications are reliable, they are not subject to the Apprendi rule.”); United States v.
Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 34–36 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no distinction between juvenile adjudications and adult convictions, but not reaching the question of a right to trial by jury
since defendant waived this right); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 749–51 (6th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the use of prior juvenile adjudications to increase sentences does
not violate due process); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1187–91 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding lower court’s application of juvenile adjudication to increase sentence);
United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694–96 (3d Cir 2003) (“A prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as prior conviction for Apprendi purposes.”); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031–33 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “juvenile adjudications can
rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes”); People v. Nguyen,
209 P.3d 946, 953–55 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he Apprendi rule does not preclude use of nonjury
juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences.”); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d
607, 615–19 (Minn. 2006) (“We hold that, in calculating a defendant’s criminal history
score, a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the
fact of a prior juvenile adjudication.”); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 649–53 (Wash. 2006)
(finding that the inclusion of defendant’s juvenile adjudications fell within Apprendi’s
prior conviction exception); People v. Mazzoni, 165 P.3d 719, 722–23 (Colo. App. 2006)
(finding “no error in the trial court’s aggravating defendant’s sentence on the basis of his
prior juvenile adjudications”); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321–23 (Ind. 2005) (finding
that juvenile adjudications can be factors in proper sentencing considerations for a trial
judge and need not be submitted to a jury); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002)
(“Juvenile adjudications need not be . . . proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be used in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score . . . .”); Nichols v.
State, 910 So. 2d 863, 864–65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to hold that “prior juvenile dispositions are not valid prior convictions for the exception to sentencing enhancements in Apprendi”).
See United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi’s narrow
‘prior conviction’ exception is limited to prior convictions resulting from proceedings
that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the ‘prior conviction’ exception does not include non-jury juvenile adjudications.”); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1281–90 (La. 2004) (“Because a juvenile adju-
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a middle position, holding that the absence of a jury right in the
prior adjudication does not preclude its use as an elevating factor,
but that a defendant has a right to a jury determination of the fact of
8
the prior juvenile adjudication.
This Comment argues that the majority position rests on a conception of the jury right that undervalues the structural role of the
jury intended by the Framers of the Constitution. My goal is to examine the practice of enhancing criminal sentences on the basis of
juvenile priors in light of a more complete and historically accurate
understanding of the jury trial right. In the course of this examination, it will become clear that an underappreciated problem with the
sentencing practice at issue is obscured by the majority position’s implicit assumption that the jury trial right is exclusively an individual
right aimed at promoting accuracy. By giving the jury’s original
structural purpose its proper place in the analysis, I will show that the
Sixth Amendment prohibits sentence enhancements based on prior
juvenile adjudications in which the accused had no right to a jury trial.
Part I describes the exception that, in the view of most courts, allows the use of juvenile priors as sentence enhancements. This Part
then traces the origin of the prior conviction exception in order to
explain the central constitutional problem with this practice. Part II
examines the arguments that courts have used to support the majority position and the usual responses to these arguments. Part III discusses the pervasive mischaracterization of the jury guarantee as a
right designed only to ensure accuracy. This Part then lays out the
support for a conception of the jury right that is not focused exclusively on accuracy, but also appreciates the role of the jury right as an
institutional allocation of power. It is then suggested that the arguments supporting the majority position rely on an incomplete understanding of the jury right. By basing their analyses on an incomplete
understanding of the Sixth Amendment, courts have obscured the
extent to which allowing sentence elevations based upon prior juvenile adjudications erodes the jury right as envisioned by the Framers.
Finally, Part IV discusses and evaluates possible steps the U.S. Supreme Court could take to resolve the asserted constitutional dilem-

8

dication is not established through a procedure guaranteeing a jury trial, it cannot be excepted from Apprendi’s general rule . . . .”).
See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 238–46 (Or. 2005) (“It is of no moment—at least for
Sixth Amendment purposes—if the legislature chooses to designate, inter alia, a prior
nonjury juvenile adjudication as an element that . . . lengthens a criminal sentence, so
long as the existence of that prior adjudication is proved to a jury . . . .”).
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ma, with particular attention paid to consistency with the structural
role of the jury.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WITH SENTENCE ELEVATION ON
THE BASIS OF PRIOR NON-JURY JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
Apprendi forbids the elevation of a criminal sentence beyond a statutorily prescribed maximum on the basis of facts not proved to a
9
jury. Recidivism enhancements are permissible only because of the
10
prior conviction exception to Apprendi’s rule. Under this exception,
a prior conviction, unlike any other fact, may be used to elevate a
criminal sentence beyond its statutorily prescribed maximum without
11
first having been proved to a jury. Whether or not the enhancement of adult sentences based upon juvenile priors is constitutionally
permissible, therefore, turns on whether juvenile non-jury adjudications fall within the prior conviction exception to Apprendi’s general
12
rule.
The exception for prior convictions is premised on the idea that
because the jury right would have attached (and been either exercised or waived) in the prior trial, there is no need to have another
13
jury find that the prior offense had been committed. In the case of
juvenile adjudications, however, a jury trial is not constitutionally
14
mandated. Indeed, most states do not provide a jury right for de15
fendants in juvenile court. The problem with lumping juvenile adjudications in with adult criminal convictions, then, is that juvenile
adjudications lack the very feature that justifies the prior conviction
exception. The exception cannot properly be interpreted to include
juvenile adjudications lacking the essential procedural safeguard that
distinguishes adult convictions from all other aggravating circumstances for Apprendi purposes.

9
10
11
12

13

14
15

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text.
Id.
If juvenile non-jury adjudications do not fall within the prior conviction exception, there
can be no doubt that they are impermissible under Apprendi when they raise the defendant’s sentence above the statutorily prescribed maximum.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (“[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any
‘fact’ of prior conviction . . . mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns
otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment
beyond the maximum of the statutory range.”).
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 5:3 (2d ed. 2010).
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Understanding the rationale for the prior conviction exception
requires an examination of two significant pre-Apprendi cases: Almen16
17
darez-Torres v. United States and Jones v. United States. In AlmendarezTorres, the Supreme Court considered whether a recidivism provision
18
constituted an offense element or a sentencing factor. Petitioner
Hugo Almendarez-Torres had been convicted of returning to the
19
United States after having been deported. This offense ordinarily
20
authorizes a sentence of not more than two years, but a related provision authorizes a sentence of up to twenty years if the initial deportation took place “subsequent to a commission of an aggravated felo21
ny.” The district court found a sentence range of seventy-seven to
22
ninety-six months applicable.
At issue on appeal was the question of whether the recidivism provision defines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced sen23
tence. The question arose not from a claim of violation of the defendant’s jury right, but rather from a claim that the sentence was not
valid because the prior conviction had not been charged in the indictment, which would be required if it were an offense element rather than merely a sentencing provision. Placing great emphasis on
24
the traditional status of recidivism as a sentencing factor, the Court
25
held that recidivism was not an element of the crime. Consequently,
the Court held, recidivism need not be stated in the indictment, nor
26
must it be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg,
dissented, concluding that the statute must be read as defining two

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24

25
26

523 U.S. 224 (1998).
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 226; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 227.
Id. at 226. The question arose not from a claim of violation of the defendant’s jury right,
but rather from a claim that the sentence was not valid because the prior conviction had
not been charged in the indictment, which would be required if it were an offense element rather than merely a sentencing provision. Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 230 (“At the outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism.
That subject matter—prior commission of a serious crime—is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine.”).
Id. at 226–27.
See id. at 247 (rejecting defendant-petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment requires
that his recidivism be treated as an offense element and therefore proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt).
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27

separate criminal offenses. The Court is required to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute that avoids a “serious constitutional doubt” over an alternative interpretation under which such doubt
28
arises. The dissent found serious constitutional doubt regarding the
“difficult question whether the Constitution requires a fact which
substantially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a
crime to be treated as an element of that crime—to be charged in the
29
indictment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.”
A year after deciding Almendarez-Torres, the Court handed down
30
Jones v. United States. At issue in Jones was whether the federal car31
jacking statute defines three distinct crimes or one crime that has
32
three penalties depending on the presence of aggravating factors.
In three separate subsections, the provision authorizes three different
punishments depending on whether the crime resulted in serious
33
bodily harm, death, or neither. Jones had been convicted by a jury
of carjacking, but neither the indictment nor the jury instruction on
the offense elements had contained any reference to serious bodily
34
injury. Moreover, the magistrate judge told Jones that he faced a
maximum sentence of fifteen years, the prescribed maximum for car35
jacking not resulting in serious bodily harm or death. At sentencing, however, Jones was given a sentence of twenty-five years on the
basis of the judge’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
the carjacking of which he had been convicted led to serious bodily
36
harm. Neither the district court nor the circuit court was persuaded
by Jones’s argument that serious bodily harm was an offense ele37
ment. At stake in the determination of whether the fact of serious
bodily harm was an element of the offense or merely a sentencing
factor was whether Jones was entitled to have that fact charged in his

27

28
29
30

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See id. at 248–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Illegal reentry simpliciter (§ 1326(a)) and illegal
reentry after conviction of an aggravated felony (§ 1326(b)(2)) are separate criminal offenses.”).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 248.
526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2119 establishes three separate offenses by
the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict).
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006).
Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–31.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231–32.
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indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
38
doubt.
The Supreme Court determined, based on a close examination of
the statutory language and an analysis of congressional intent, that
the relevant statute is best read to treat serious bodily harm as an
39
element of a distinct offense rather than an enhancement. Recog40
nizing, however, that the alternative view was plausible, the Court
ultimately supported its construction by appealing to the venerable
principle that “where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by
the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt
41
the latter.” Undertaking a thorough examination of the relevant
precedent as well as the history and origin of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court concluded that “there is reason to suppose that in the
present circumstances . . . the relative diminution of the jury’s signi42
ficance would merit Sixth Amendment concern.” The Court therefore resolved the question in exactly the same manner suggested by
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-Torres.
Having adopted the reasoning of the Almendarez-Torres dissent and
based its opinion on the existence of significant constitutional doubt
regarding a practice that the Almendarez-Torres majority had held constitutionally permissible, the Jones Court was in a bind. The Court
could either overrule the year-old Almendarez-Torres precedent or explain why there was no constitutional doubt about classifying recidivism as a sentencing factor that need not be proven to a jury. The
Court distinguished the fact of a prior conviction from other facts
that increase criminal sentences in two ways. First, the Court observed that the holding of Almendarez-Torres rested heavily on “the
43
tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor.” Second,
the Court explained the “constitutional distinctiveness” of recidivism
as follows: “unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge
the possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself
have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
44
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” In other words, the reason that prior convictions escape the constitutional doubt that sur38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 232.
Id. at 232–39.
Id. at 239.
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id. (emphasis added).

798

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:3

rounds all other sentence-elevating facts is that the facts underpinning a prior conviction have already been charged in an indictment
and, barring guilty pleas and waivers of the jury right, found to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.
Neither the Almendarez-Torres dissent nor the Jones majority had, of
course, actually held unconstitutional the practice of circumventing
juries by defining certain facts as sentencing factors rather than of45
fense elements. Neither opinion reached this question. Rather,
both opinions merely suggested that there was sufficient constitutional
doubt to compel the Court to answer questions of statutory construction so as to avoid the potential constitutional conflict. Separate concurrences by Justices Stevens and Scalia in Jones went further, expressing not mere constitutional doubt, but confidence that the
Constitution forbids legislatures to diminish the role of the jury in
46
this manner. These concurring opinions laid the framework for the
Court’s decision in Apprendi, where it would confront the constitu47
tional question directly. It is important, therefore, to understand
Apprendi’s holding and, in particular, the prior conviction exception,
against the backdrop of Jones and Almendarez-Torres.
Indeed, in Apprendi, the Court explicitly adopted the formulation
of the general rule as it was articulated in the Jones concurrences:
“[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
48
which a criminal defendant is exposed.” Additionally, the Court
adopted the Jones majority’s position that Almendarez-Torres was limited
49
50
to recidivism and that opinion’s explanation of why. The Court

45

46

47

48
49

See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the principle he believed controlled the case “requires merely a determination of serious constitutional doubt, and not a determination of unconstitutionality”).
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”); id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I set forth as my considered view, that it is unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”).
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (“With [the exception of the fact of prior
conviction], we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in
[Jones]: ‘[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Id. at 488 (quoting language in Jones that states that both majority and dissent in Almendarez-Torres agreed that the case’s holding was limited to recidivism).
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reiterated the position that Almendarez-Torres was “at best an excep51
tional departure from the historic practice,” and then went on to
52
explicitly treat the case as “a narrow exception to the general rule.”
Given the background of the prior conviction exception, it is clear
that this narrow exception can be reconciled with the rationale of
Apprendi only because the facts necessary to prove the prior conviction in the first instance were presented to a jury which adjudged
53
them true beyond a reasonable doubt.
This rationale produces an exception for prior convictions that
can only be logically applied when the jury right has already attached
at the prior trial. Because no such right ever attaches in the case of
juvenile adjudications, the rule is improperly circumvented when
such an adjudication is used to increase a criminal sentence. The result is that facts that have never been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury increase a criminal sentence beyond the statutory
maximum, bringing this practice squarely within the prohibition of
Apprendi.
In other words, using prior juvenile adjudications to impose
greater punishment stretches the Almendarez-Torres exception to the
Apprendi rule in a way that distorts the precedent and cannot, despite
assertions by many courts to the contrary, be constitutionally permissible.

50

51
52
53

Compare id. (“[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior
conviction . . . mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment . . . .”) with Jones,
526 U.S. at 249 (“[U]nlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible
penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the . . . jury trial guarantee[]. Almendarez-Torres cannot, then, be
read to resolve the due process and Sixth Amendment questions implicated by reading
[the sentence-enhancing provisions at issue as sentencing factors as opposed to offense
elements] . . . .”).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 490.
More precisely, it is the opportunity of the accused to insist that all elements of the offense
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that allows the prior conviction exception
to be squared with Apprendi’s rationale. In reality, of course, offense elements are often
admitted in a guilty plea or found true in a bench trial to which the accused has agreed.
The Sixth Amendment does not, therefore, require that the right to a jury trial be exercised. It should be noted, however, that some of the most prominent scholarly criticism
of Apprendi centers around the failure of that decision to recognize the prevalence of plea
bargaining and the attendant diminution of the jury’s role in today’s criminal justice system. See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 465 (2002); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001).
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THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SENTENCE ELEVATIONS BASED
ON JUVENILE NON-JURY ADJUDICATIONS

As noted above, the majority of courts of appeals and state courts
have taken approaches counter to the one proposed in this Com54
ment. This Part canvasses the main arguments made in favor of the
majority position and lays out the typical response to each. The following section examines each argument in light of the jury’s role in
our constitutional structure beyond that of a mere guarantor of reliability, a perspective that has largely been ignored by both sides of the
debate.
A. The Argument Based on the Satisfaction of All Applicable Due Process
Requirements in the Juvenile Proceeding
The most frequently adopted argument in support of sentence
elevation based on juvenile non-jury adjudications is grounded in the
fact that such adjudications are constitutionally valid despite the ab55
sence of a jury right. Essentially, the argument is that because the
juvenile proceeding comported with all applicable due process requirements, that decision falls within the prior conviction exception
56
and is therefore a valid basis for a sentence enhancement.
This argument highlights the constitutional tension between Apprendi and the case in which the Supreme Court held that the right to
trial by jury does not extend to juvenile proceedings, McKeiver v.
57
Pennsylvania. In McKeiver, the Court cited a long list of justifications
58
for its decision. At its core, the decision rested on the Court’s ideal
59
of a juvenile system that is not punitive and adversarial in nature,
54
55

56

57
58
59

See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 949 (Cal. 2009) (“That authority [to increase a
sentence on the basis of a defendant’s recidivism] may properly be exercised . . . when
the recidivism is evidenced . . . by a constitutionally valid prior adjudication of criminal
conduct.”).
See id. at 953 (“[W]e agree with the majority view that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as construed in Apprendi, do not preclude the sentence-enhancing use,
against an adult felon, of a prior valid, fair, and reliable adjudication that the defendant,
while a minor, previously engaged in felony misconduct, where the juvenile proceeding
included all the constitutional protections applicable to such matters, even though these
protections do not include the right to jury trial.”).
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“[W]e conclude that trial by jury
in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”).
See id. at 545–50 (enumerating thirteen justifications for the court’s decision).
See id. at 545 (“[I]f required as a matter of constitutional precept, [the jury trial might]
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and [might] put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”).
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but rather serves a rehabilitative goal and positions the government
60
in a protective relationship vis-à-vis the youth. In other words, the
decision not to afford to juveniles the full procedural protection afforded to adults rests on a belief that juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different in their nature and purpose than criminal tri61
als.
When juvenile adjudications are used to elevate adult sentences,
however, determinations made in a forum with weak due process protections are stripped from that context and used in a way that has serious implications for the liberty of the defendant. This practice raises serious due process concerns and provides additional support for
the view that sentence elevation on the basis of prior non-jury juve62
nile adjudications is constitutionally problematic.
Writing in dissent in the most recent case to address the use of juvenile adjudications as sentence enhancements in subsequent adult
proceedings, Judge Posner observed:
The constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to
be entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in mind
than just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a juvenile had all
the process he was entitled to doesn’t make his juvenile conviction equiv63
alent, for purposes of recidivist enhancements, to adult convictions.

60
61

62

63

See id. at 547 (“[W]e are particularly reluctant to say . . . that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals.”).
See generally Courtney P. Fain, Note, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile
“Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495 (2008) (arguing that jury
rights should not be extended to juvenile proceedings to legitimize their use in adult sentencing, but rather that they should not be used in adult sentencing because of further
differences between juvenile and adult criminal systems).
For a more detailed exposition of this problem, see Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he absence of a jury right detracts from the factual accuracy of delinquency
convictions, adversely affects the quality of justice and delivery of legal services in juvenile
courts, and raises significant questions about the propriety of using delinquency adjudications to enhance adult criminal sentences under the Apprendi exception for prior convictions”). See also Fain, supra note 62; Cart Rixey, Note, The Ultimate Disillusionment: The
Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2009) (suggesting “that the Kansas Supreme Court correctly held that the reasoning and public policy
considerations of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania no longer apply because of the changing and
increasingly punitive nature of juvenile codes”).
Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431–32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). The
constitutionality under Apprendi of using juvenile non-jury adjudications as aggravating
factors in subsequent adult sentencing proceedings had not been addressed in the Seventh Circuit before Welch v. United States. Id. at 429. The question was presented indirectly through the defendant’s argument that his lawyer’s failure to raise the question at
the sentencing proceeding constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 411. The
panel joined the majority of other circuits in holding that juvenile adjudications fall with-
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In short, the juvenile proceedings comport with a less strict due
process requirement because they have a different purpose from
64
adult courts. Fewer due process protections are required in juvenile
courts because those courts do not sit to mete out punishment, but
rather to find a way to rehabilitate young people. When this determination is stripped from its context and used for an essentially punitive purpose, however, the lower due process bar can no longer be
justified by appeal to the parens patriae nature of the juvenile forum.
Moreover, this argument strains the justification for the prior con65
viction exception by, in effect, substituting the predicate “constitutional validity of the prior adjudication” for “availability of a jury trial
in the previous conviction.” It is easy to see that attachment of a jury
right in a prior conviction might have some bearing on what the
Sixth Amendment requires for use of that conviction as a sentence
enhancement in a subsequent proceeding. There is no such logical
connection that explains why the Sixth Amendment’s requirement
should be satisfied in a case where no jury right ever attached.
B. The Argument Based on the Status of Recidivism as a “Highly
Traditional” Basis for a Judge’s Decision to Enhance a Sentence
In its most basic form, the argument that recidivism is traditionally
part of a judge’s discretion at sentencing and, therefore, need not be
proven to a jury is simply not responsive to the underlying question.
Almendarez-Torres makes perfectly clear that sentence elevation based
66
on prior convictions falls within a judge’s traditional discretion, but
reiterating this fact does nothing to advance the inquiry into whether
juvenile adjudications count as prior convictions for this purpose under
Apprendi. The nature and purpose of the juvenile justice system support the contention that juvenile adjudications are not “convictions”
67
at all, but something else entirely.

64
65
66
67

in the prior conviction exception to Apprendi. Id. at 426. In his dissent, Posner goes on to
point out that keying Apprendi’s scope and that of the prior conviction exception to the
due process afforded in the prior tribunal seems to lead to an untenable result: might
not a conviction for a military crime by a military commission with very limited due
process protections nonetheless be used to enhance a later ordinary criminal sentence?
Id. at 432.
See Fain, supra note 62, at 518 (stating that rehabilitation is the goal of juvenile courts).
See supra Part I.
See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998) (noting that recidivism
is the most traditional basis on which a court may increase a criminal sentence).
See Fain, supra note 62, at 519 (“[J]uvenile court proceedings are considered non-criminal
in nature . . . .”).
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Moreover, it is something of a sleight of hand when the traditional
“recidivism” factor is substituted for the fact of a prior juvenile adjudication. The traditional rationales that justify allowing a judge to
enhance a sentence on the basis of recidivism do not apply to juvenile
adjudications. Whether recidivism enhancements serve a crime pre68
vention purpose or a retributive purpose is open for debate. A definition of “recidivism” that includes juvenile adjudications seems at
odds with either rationale. With respect to the crime control rationale, it is not at all clear that juvenile crime has the predictive value
69
of adult crime when it comes to future offenses. With respect to the
retributivist rationale, criminal actions committed by children might
not constitute the same reflection on moral character as crimes
70
committed by adults. Moreover, research on community views suggest that although people do consider a repeat offense somewhat
more blameworthy than a first offense, the dramatic enhancement of
sentences under most three-strikes or habitual offender statutes di71
verges sharply from shared intuitions of justice.
A more subtle form of this argument relies on Oregon v. Ice, which
held that a state may constitutionally assign to a judge—rather than a
jury—responsibility for finding facts necessary to support imposing
72
sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. The Court held
that this was the case because “[t]here is no encroachment here by
73
the judge upon facts historically found by the jury.” The argument,
as it applies here, is that because juvenile trials have traditionally
been held in the absence of juries, there is no encroachment on the

68

69

70

71

72
73

Such provisions are most often justified on incapacitation grounds. Proponents argue
that a history of recidivism shows that the defendant cannot be deterred and therefore
must be incarcerated to prevent the commission of future crimes. See Paul H. Robinson
et al., The Disutility of Injustice 8 (Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470905 (describing
the justifications commonly offered for habitual offender statutes).
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Essay, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
820–21 (2003) (relying on the work of several psychiatric studies to conclude that much
crime committed by youths is better understood as “experimentation in risky behavior . . . [as] part of identity development” that, more often than not, “desists naturally as
individuals develop a stable sense of self and maturity of judgment”).
See id. (arguing that “[t]he criminal choices of typical young offenders differ from those
of adults . . . because the adolescent’s criminal act does not express the actor’s bad character,” whereas most adults who commit crimes “act upon subjectively defined preferences and values”).
See Robinson et al., supra note 68, at 27, 29 (describing empirical research showing that
“the crime-control doctrines most divergent from community views include . . . threestrikes (habitual offender) doctrines”).
See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714–15 (2009).
Id. at 718.
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historic role of the jury when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent
without a jury right and that adjudication is subsequently used to enhance an adult criminal sentence. This version of the argument asserts that, like the fact of a prior conviction, juvenile delinquency is
traditionally a determination for the judge, not the jury. This argument fails because juveniles have received a wide range of treatment
74
by courts throughout history. Ice’s historical inquiry is therefore
simply not probative. The varying treatment through time and
among states makes it impossible to say what questions tradition reserves for judges as opposed to juries.
C. The Technical Compliance Argument
Some courts have embraced the view that, as long as the jury in
the subsequent adult trial makes a determination as to the fact of the
prior conviction, Apprendi is technically satisfied. According to this
argument, Apprendi requires only that the jury in the current case
find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a prior adjudication of
guilt, and that it is not necessary that the actual facts supporting a
75
guilty verdict ever be found by a jury. This is the intermediate ap76
proach adopted by the state of Oregon.
At best, this approach is formalistic. At worst, it is an insulting circumvention of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to a
jury trial. Either way, the argument does not withstand scrutiny; it
pays lip service to the Sixth Amendment and cannot be reconciled
with Apprendi’s robust jury right. As California Supreme Court Justice
Kennard pointed out, such an argument “opens the door to whole77
sale evasion or trivialization of the holding in Apprendi.”
III.
THE COMMON MISTAKE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
THE MAJORITY POSITION: OVERLOOKING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF
THE JURY
The previous Parts have surveyed the arguments in support of the
majority position and the most common responses to them. This

74
75

76
77

See State v. Rudy B., 216 P.3d 810, 818 (N.M. App. 2009) (summarizing the widely varied
treatment of juveniles by courts).
See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 246 (Or. 2005) (holding that “the use of prior juvenile
adjudications as sentencing factors in Oregon does not violate the jury trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . [but] when such an adjudication is offered as an enhancement . . . its existence must . . . be proved to a trier of fact”).
Id.
People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 962 (Cal. 2009) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Part suggests that a critical mischaracterization—or at least a mistaken emphasis—is common to all of the majority-position arguments.
This mischaracterization obscures the way in which the majority position erodes the jury right by undermining an important function of
the jury within our constitutional structure. That function, this
Comment argues, is not merely to guarantee the accuracy of judicial
proceedings but also to serve as a “bulwark between the State and the
78
accused at the trial for an alleged offense.” The courts that have
adopted the majority position err in their treatment of the right to a
jury trial as only a check on accuracy, and not also a “fundamental
79
reservation of power in our constitutional structure” as was intended
80
by the Framers and is commanded by Apprendi.
A. The Right to a Jury Trial Was Designed to Reserve to the People Power over
the Judiciary and to Protect Them from Tyranny of the Government
Professor Akhil Amar proposes that “it is anachronistic to see jury
trial as an issue of individual right rather than (also, and more fun81
damentally) a question of government structure.” Strong historical
evidence supports the proposition that the Framers’ intent in passing
the Sixth Amendment was to reserve to the people a democratic
82
check on the power of the Judicial Branch. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, emphasizing the importance of the jury’s role as a check on the
judiciary, indicated that it would be better that the people be left
without a role in the Legislative Branch than that they be excluded
83
from oversight of the judiciary.
Jefferson’s observation was not the only recognition of the jury’s
role in a government by the people—it is only the most famous. Professor Laura Appleman has canvassed seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury sources and determined unequivocally that an Founding-era
audience would have “understood the right to a jury trial to be a col84
lective right.” This historical observation contrasts sharply with to78
79
80

81
82

83
84

See Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 717 (describing the animating principle of Apprendi).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
See id. (referring to the jury right as a “fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure” and asserting that “Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the
judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict”).
AMAR, supra note 4, at 104.
See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 780 (2005) (discussing the Founders’ “recogni[tion of] the importance of the division of power between
the judiciary and the jury”).
Id. (citing 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82 (H.A. Washington ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1864)).
See Appleman, supra note 4, at 399.
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day’s prevalent understanding of the jury as an individual right possessed by defendants and aimed at ensuring accuracy. In the early
nineteenth century, Tocqueville’s observations led him to place the
jury right on par with the right to vote as an instrument of democratic
rule: “[t]he system of the jury, as it is understood in America, appears to me as direct and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the
sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage. These are two equally
85
powerful means of making the majority reign.” He understood the
86
jury as, first and foremost, a “political institution.”
In the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the institutional understanding of the jury right is perhaps most clearly articulated in the
opinions of Justice Scalia through the Apprendi line. Beginning with
Apprendi itself, Scalia lays out his view in response to Justice Breyer’s
87
assertion that, in modern times, the jury cannot provide fairness.
Scalia chides Breyer, noting that his opinion “sketches an admirably
fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice designed . . . to leave
88
criminal justice to the State.”
He goes on to note that “[t]he
[F]ounders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it
to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least
89
controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights.”
These quotations
suggest that, in Scalia’s view, the jury right was the Founders’ way of
checking the judicial power of the state.
Scalia is even clearer in subsequent opinions. Most importantly,
in Blakely v. Washington, Scalia, this time writing for the majority, characterizes the jury right as “no mere procedural formality, but a fun90
damental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” He
goes on to argue, citing founding era documents including the diary
of John Adams, that “[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate
control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to
91
ensure their control in the judiciary.” In Ring v. Arizona, Justice Scalia explicitly rejects characterization of the jury right as merely a
guarantee of accuracy, noting that “[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial
right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficien92
cy of potential factfinders.”
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., trans., 2000) (1835).
Id. at 260 (“The jury is . . . before everything a political institution.”).
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
Id.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002).
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A view of the jury as more than a guarantor of accuracy is reflected beyond Scalia’s opinions in the Apprendi line. The Apprendi majority, quoting an early constitutional authority, recognizes that the historical function of the jury is “[t]o guard against a spirit of oppression
and tyranny on the part of rulers” and to serve “as the great bulwark
93
of [our] civil and political liberties.” Jones, the clear forerunner of
the Apprendi line, also undertakes an extensive examination of the
94
history of the Sixth Amendment and reaches the same conclusion.
Additionally, the Court’s holding that Ring v. Arizona does not apply retroactively provides further support for the notion that the
Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi is not concerned pri95
marily with accuracy. The retroactivity inquiry centers on the risk of
inaccurately convicting a person for conduct the law does not prohibit, or, in death penalty cases, erroneously reaching the conclusion
96
that the law allows the sentence of death. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, dismisses the assertion that judicial fact97
finding seriously diminishes accuracy, suggesting that accurate factfinding is not what underpins Ring and the rest of the Apprendi line.
The four Justices in dissent argue that accuracy concerns do warrant
retroactive application of Ring’s rule. Yet the accuracy they have in
mind is not accurate fact-finding, but rather accurate reflection of
98
community values.
B. When Viewed Through the Lens of the Jury’s Institutional Role, the
Arguments in Support of the Majority Position Fail
Having explained the importance of understanding the Sixth
Amendment not only as a protection of the rights of an individual defendant but also as an institutional check on government power, I

93

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245–49 (1999) (citing early authorities such as
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1769) in support of the proposition that the jury
right was perceived at the time of the founding as a check on the power of the state).
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (rejecting respondent’s argument that
Ring articulated a watershed rule that must be applied retroactively).
See id. at 355; id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 356 (majority opinion) (“When so many presumably reasonable minds continue to
disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that
judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy.”)
Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
THE

94

95
96
97

98
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now turn to an application of this perspective to the arguments in fa99
vor of the majority position.
The argument based on the satisfaction of all constitutionally
100
mandated due process requirements in the juvenile proceeding
perhaps most clearly reflects a mistaken emphasis on reliability. The
pivotal role that reliability plays in this argument is evident, for example, in United States v. Matthews, in which the First Circuit adopted
the majority rule:
Thus, while their outcomes differed, all of the courts to consider the
issue have agreed that “the question of whether juvenile adjudications
should be exempt from Apprendi’s general rule should [ ] turn on . . . an
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are
so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemp101
tion.”

If the only purpose of the jury right were to protect the defendant
by ensuring reliability, then the fact that juvenile non-jury adjudications satisfy all applicable due process requirements might justify
treating them like adult convictions for Apprendi purposes. After all,
the argument goes, the Supreme Court’s holding that juries are not
required in juvenile courts suggests that juvenile adjudications are at
least accurate enough. But once it is recognized that the “jury trial
right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficien102
cy of potential factfinders” but instead on a fundamental reservation to the people of control over the judiciary, an additional weakness in this argument is revealed.
103
The untenability of the Oregon approach is also exposed once
the jury right is understood as a fundamental reservation of power to
the people over the judiciary. Viewed through this lens, the practice
of allowing sentences to be elevated on the basis of non-jury adjudications of guilt can be seen for what it is: an illicit transfer of power
from jury to judge and an erosion of the jury right. Allowing a judge
to take notice of a prior conviction tried before a jury, as does the
prior conviction exception, does not transfer power from jury to
99
100

101
102
103

See supra Part II.
That is, the use of a juvenile non-jury adjudication to elevate a subsequent adult sentence
does not violate Apprendi so long as the adjudication comported with all constitutionally
mandated due process requirements. See discussion supra Part II.A.
United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002)).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 536, 607 (2002).
Oregon has adopted the position that Apprendi’s requirement is satisfied if a jury in the
adult case finds that there was a previous conviction, even if that previous “conviction”
was a juvenile adjudication at which no jury right attached. See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d
236, 238–46 (Or. 2005); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
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judge; rather, it transfers power from one jury to another: from the
jury in the present trial to the jury in the original trial. When, on the
other hand, jury determination of the fact of a prior conviction is allowed to stand in for jury determination of the facts that support the
prior conviction, power is transferred to the judge in the juvenile
proceeding, and the jury right is rendered meaningless. Because in
such a scenario “the length of a sentence is made to depend upon
104
facts removed from [the jury’s] determination,” the jury’s role is
impermissibly diminished in a way that is contrary to “the system en105
visioned by a Constitution that guarantees trial by jury.”
The argument that non-jury juvenile adjudications are convictions
for Apprendi purposes because recidivism is a highly traditional basis
106
on which a judge may increase a sentence reflects the same onesided understanding of the jury right. When approached with the
jury’s role as a mechanism of popular sovereignty in mind, this tradition-based argument is persuasive only when the assigning the determination in question to a judge does not allow the judiciary to misappropriate power that traditionally belongs to the people.
Otherwise, the role of the jury is unacceptably diminished. When a
judge bases a recidivism enhancement on a juvenile adjudication,
however, she unquestionably takes from the jury the right to determine questions tradtionally within their province—the facts supporting an adjudication of guilt.

IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WITH
USING PRIOR JUVENILE NON-JURY ADJUDICATIONS AS SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENTS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED AS AN ADULT

If the use of prior juvenile non-jury adjudications to enhance
adult sentences is a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial,
as this Comment has argued, this problem could be resolved by the
107
Supreme Court in one of three ways. One option would be for the
104
105
106
107

Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See discussion supra Part II.B.
The Court has rejected numerous petitions for certiorari in cases that squarely presented
this issue; among those cases are decisions that have reached opposite results. See, e.g.,
United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238
(2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the use
of procedurally sound juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences does not violate
due process), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183
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Supreme Court to overrule Almendarez-Torres and hold that prior convictions are not exempted from the general principle laid out in Apprendi. A second possibility would be to hold that juveniles have a
constitutional right to a trial by jury, overruling McKeiver. Juvenile adjudications going forward would therefore include a jury right and
would fall within the Almendarez-Torres prior conviction exception.
Finally, the Court could simply hold that a non-jury juvenile conviction does not fall within the prior conviction exception to Apprendi.
Each of these possibilities will be addressed in turn.
A. Overruling Almendarez-Torres
Because the continued viability of Almendarez-Torres has been in
108
question almost since it was handed down, perhaps the most obvious solution would be to overrule that case, which is limited to the
109
fact of recidivism alone, and update the Apprendi rule to reflect the
lack of a prior conviction exception. The characterization of Almen110
darez-Torres as “an exceptional departure from . . . historic practice”
111
that was “arguabl[y] . . . incorrectly decided,” coupled with the fact
that it was a five-four decision about which a fifth justice has subse-

108

109
110
111

(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003); People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2091 (2010); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 836 (2006); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104
(2003); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004) (finding the use of juvenile adjudications to increase a defendant’s penalty as unconstitutional), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1177 (2005); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1137
(2007). Nevertheless, the Court is certain to continue to receive petitions presenting this
issue. Indeed, at least one petition raising this issue was pending when this Comment
went to print. See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), petition for cert.
filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2010) (10-314). In Welch, the Seventh Circuit addressed for the first time the question of whether juvenile adjudications could be used to
elevate adult sentences and concluded that “because juvenile adjudications are reliable,
they are not subject to the Apprendi rule.” Id. at 429. Judge Posner dissented, interpreting Apprendi to require that a prior conviction used as a sentence elevating factor “must
be the outcome of a proceeding in which the defendant had a right to have a jury determine his guilt.” Id. at 431 (Posner, J., dissenting).
See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:
Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 554 (2009) (observing that in addition to the four dissenting justices in Almendarez-Torres, Justice Thomas, who sided with
the majority, has also expressed the view that the case might have been wrongly decided).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (noting the general agreement that the holding of Almendarez-Torres was limited to recidivism).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 489.
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quently expressed reservations, suggest that this is a plausible scenario. However, the recent decision in Ice, which enshrined into the
Apprendi jurisprudence the importance of the traditional classifica113
tion of a fact as a sentencing factor, might have changed this calculus somewhat because of its implicit endorsement of the logic underpinning Almendarez-Torres.
Perhaps more importantly, overruling Almendarez-Torres would
close the prior conviction exception not only to juvenile non-jury adjudications, but also to prior adult convictions that were decided by
juries. It is therefore an overbroad solution to the problem discussed
in this Comment. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would
resolve the constitutional problem associated with sentence enhancement based on juvenile priors by overruling a precedent that,
as it applies to adult convictions, does not raise any constitutional
concerns.
B. Overruling McKeiver
The Supreme Court could remedy the constitutional obstacle to
use of juvenile priors by doing away with non-jury juvenile adjudications altogether. This could, of course, be accomplished by state legislatures. Indeed, some states have provided such a right in limited
circumstances, but even in those states the vast majority of juvenile
114
adjudications are not decided by juries. At least one state supreme
court has held that juveniles do have a state constitutional right to a
115
jury trial.
Eliminating the problem nationally, however, would require the
U.S. Supreme Court to explicitly overrule McKeiver. Some critics of
the juvenile justice system have argued that the Court should do just
116
that.
The argument for doing so is essentially that the rationale

112
113

114

115
116

See id. at 499–523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717 (2009) (finding historical practice adequate to justify leaving consideration of facts relevant to the decision to impose multiple sentences
consecutively or concurrently to the judge rather than the jury).
See Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds? The Case
for Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161, 177–78 n.118 (2004) (stating that between 1% and 3%
of juvenile adjudications are decided by juries in states where juveniles have the right to a
jury trial).
See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 171–72 (Kan. 2008) (holding that juveniles have a right to a
jury trial under the Kansas Constitution).
See Feld, supra note 63, at 1111 (arguing that McKeiver should be overruled); see also Rixey,
supra note 63, at 887 (arguing that the reasoning of McKeiver has been undermined by
changes in the juvenile system).
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underpinning the McKeiver decision is no longer applicable.
In
other words, because juvenile codes have become increasingly punitive and less rehabilitative, the absence of a jury guarantee can no
longer be justified, as it was in McKeiver, by appealing to the parens pa118
triae role of the state in juvenile proceedings. One scholar has even
gone so far as to argue that Apprendi should provide additional motivation to the Court to overrule McKeiver so that juvenile adjudications
could be used to enhance adult sentences without raising constitu119
tional doubts.
Essentially, then, the decision between this solution and the overruling of Almendarez-Torres boils down to the question of whether it is
more desirable to overhaul the juvenile justice system by providing a
constitutional jury right to avoid the tension with Apprendi, or to close
the prior conviction exception in Apprendi to bring that case’s rule in
line with the reality of the juvenile justice system. The policy consid120
erations in favor of the former are compelling, but the constitutional argument does not appear to have gained much traction within
the court. Moreover, this possibility seems less likely than the latter,
as the Court has not expressed the same doubts about McKeiver as it
121
has about the continued viability of the Almendarez-Torres precedent.
At any rate, speculation regarding the relative likelihood that the
Court will overrule one of the two aforementioned precedents ultimately does not provide guidance as to what the Court should do. As
a solution to the constitutional problem with which this Comment is
concerned, this solution, like the possibility of overruling AlmendarezTorres, is overbroad. Overruling McKeiver would provide a new jury
right to juveniles even where the constitutional problem with which
this Comment is concerned does not arise, depriving states of the
flexibility that the Court has deemed necessary to a distinct informal

117
118

119

120

121

See Rixey, supra note 63, at 887.
See id. (“[T]he reasoning and public policy considerations of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania no
longer apply because of the changing and increasingly punitive nature of juvenile
codes.”).
See Feld, supra note 63, at 1111–12 (“McKeiver long has been ripe for overruling on its own
merits, and Apprendi provides additional impetus for the Supreme Court and states to
grant juveniles a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial so that criminal courts
properly may use delinquency adjudications as a legitimate ‘fact of a prior conviction.’”).
See generally Feld, supra note 63 (arguing that the constitutional tension between Apprendi
and McKeiver should be resolved by overruling McKeiver and requiring jury trials in juvenile courts); Rixey, supra note 63 (advocating the overruling of McKeiver because the policy considerations underpinning it are no longer applicable).
See discussion supra Part I.A.
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and rehabilitation-oriented juvenile justice system.
While there is
good reason to believe this would be a change for the better, such a
broad solution is not called for by the narrow constitutional problem
in question.
C. A Juvenile Adjudication Is Not a Conviction Within the Meaning of the
Almendarez-Torres Exception to Apprendi
The solution most compatible with Supreme Court precedent
would be to hold that a non-jury juvenile adjudication is not a prior
conviction for Apprendi purposes. In other words, rather than changing the Apprendi rule or upending the juvenile justice system, the
Court could simply answer in the negative the central question addressed in this Comment, which currently divides the circuits and
state courts. The Court could simply hold that a non-jury adjudication is not a prior conviction for purposes of the exception to Apprendi.
Allowing judges alone to elevate sentences substantially erodes the
jury right and undermines the reservation of power to the people
that the framers sought to effectuate by guaranteeing the right to a
jury trial. It does so in a way that Almendarez-Torres does not because,
unlike in the case of a previous adult conviction, no jury has ever
found the ultimate facts necessary to find the defendant guilty. Significantly, this position is also consistent with the McKeiver rationale
regarding the differences between adult and juvenile criminal proceedings. Because this solution does not require overruling any past
precedents, it seems the most plausible. Moreover, it resolves the
narrow constitutional problem with elevating sentences based on
prior juvenile adjudications with no collateral effects for other parties. Finally, it effectively reconciles the Apprendi rule with the concern that truly underpins the Sixth Amendment Jury Guarantee. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in an ap123
propriate case and hold explicitly, as have the Ninth Circuit and the
Louisiana Supreme Court, that prior juvenile non-jury adjudications
are not prior convictions within the meaning of Apprendi and therefore may not constitutionally be used to enhance sentences in later
adult criminal proceedings.
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See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (“If the formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little
need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day,
but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.”).
The Court receives petitions for certiorari in such cases regularly. See supra note 108.
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CONCLUSION

This Comment has sought to address the constitutional problem
under Apprendi and its progeny that arises when a prior non-jury juvenile adjudication is used to enhance an adult defendant’s sentence
for a subsequent crime. My aim was to examine this question in light
of an understanding of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee as not
only an individual right aimed at assuring accuracy, but also a community right designed to limit the power of the state.
To be clear, my intent has not been to diminish the importance of
the jury right’s role in ensuring accurate fact-finding and protecting
individual defendants. Rather, I have sought to draw attention to the
other important aspect of the right to a jury trial, and to examine
what a more complete understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s jury
guarantee suggests about the unresolved question of juvenile adjudications as elevating factors in subsequent adult sentencing. An examination of the arguments favoring the majority position reveals
that they fail to account for the jury’s structural role. In light of this
determination, this Comment proposes that the Supreme Court hold
explicitly that juvenile non-jury adjudications may not later be used to
increase the sentence of an adult defendant.

